Nowadays, the interconnection of automotive systems with modern digital devices o ers advanced user experiences to drivers. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) carry out a multitude of operations using the insecure Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). erefore, dangerous a acks, such as disabling brakes, are possible and the safety of passengers is at risk. In this paper, we present TACAN (Transmi er Authentication in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs by exploiting the covert channels without introducing CAN protocol modi cations or tra c overheads (i.e., no extra bits or messages are used). TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept of covert channels and exploits it to build an e ective defensive technique that facilitates transmi er authentication via a trusted Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three di erent covert channels for ECU authentication: 1) Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based, leveraging the IATs of CAN messages; 2) o set-based, exploiting the clock o sets of CAN messages; 3) Least Signi cant Bit (LSB)-based, concealing authentication messages into the LSBs of normal CAN data. We implement the covert channels of TACAN on the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR testbed and evaluate their performance through extensive experiments using real vehicle datasets. We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN, highlighting no tra c overheads and a esting the regular functionality of ECUs. In particular, the bit error ratios are within 0.1% and 0.42% for the IAT-based and o set-based covert channels, respectively. Furthermore, the bit error ratio of the LSB-based covert channel is equal to that of a normal CAN bus, which is 3.1 × 10 −7 %.
INTRODUCTION
e Controller Area Network (CAN) enables communication among Electronic Control Units (ECUs) for closed in-vehicle networks [2, 16] .
e security of CAN bus is crucial to the functionality and safety of today's automobiles and future's autonomous cars [1, 34] . Since the CAN bus is a broadcast medium without authentication, a compromised ECU can be used to masquerade as any targeted ECU by transmi ing messages with the forged message ID (masquerade a ack [3] ). Modern externally accessible ECUs with additional connectivity interfaces such as cellular, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth disrupt the closed in-vehicle network assumption. Consequently, the CAN bus has shown to be vulnerable to cyber a acks, such as disabled brakes [3] and remotely controlled steering [30] .
Use of cryptographic primitives such as message authentication is one way to defend against a acks (notably the masquerade a ack) on the CAN bus. However, it can be challenging in practice due to the low throughput and tight bit budget of the CAN protocol, and current solutions such as [14, 20, 26, 33] require protocol modi cations or introduce tra c overheads. An alternative is to deploy anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) without modifying the CAN protocol [5] [6] [7] 25] , including timingbased and voltage-based IDSs. e timing-based IDS in [5] exploits CAN message periodicity to estimate clock skew as a unique ngerprint to detect masquerade a acks. Nevertheless, it was later shown to be ine ective against the cloaking a ack that modi es the inter-transmission time to emulate the clock skew of the targeted ECU [28, 35] . e voltage-based IDSs [6, 7, 17, 24] a empt to ngerprint the a acker through voltage signal characteristics. However, Figure 1 : Illustration of TACAN. Legitimate ECUs transmit unique authentication messages that are embedded into the timing and LSBs of normal CAN messages (e.g., A1, B2, and C3) using the proposed covert channel methodologies. e Monitor Node authenticates transmitting ECUs by verifying the received authentication messages. If the compromised ECUs cannot generate valid authentication messages, then the attack will be detected by the Monitor Node.
if the a acker uses IDs that the compromised ECU is allowed to use under normal conditions, the a ack will not be detected.
In this work, we develop TACAN that allows the trusted Monitor Node (MN) to verify the authenticity of a transmi ing ECU and detect CAN bus anomalies, as illustrated in Figure 1 . In TACAN, a master key is shared between an ECU and the MN for generating shared session keys. Consistently with [14, 26, 33] , we assume that the keys are stored in the tamper-resistant memory of a security module such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [12] . Each ECU embeds unique authentication messages into CAN messages and continuously transmits them through covert channels, which can be received and veri ed by the MN.
erefore, if the a acker has no access to the TPM of the targeted ECU, it cannot use the compromised ECU or external device to generate valid authentication messages, thus causing veri cation failures and triggering the alarm at the MN side. Moreover, TACAN will detect a acks (e.g., Denial-of-Service (DoS) a ack) that interrupt the transmission of CAN messages that are used to embed the authentication messages.
e main bene ts of using covert channels for TACAN are that they do not introduce protocol modi cations or tra c overheads (i.e., extra bits or messages). In addition, by requiring ECUs to transmit authentication messages much less frequently than per-message authentication schemes, TACAN can signi cantly reduce the computational burden of the resource-constrained ECUs.
Contributions:
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We identify and exploit covert channels to facilitate ECU authentication on the CAN bus. Hence, covert channels are used for security instead of malicious communication.
• We propose TACAN, which consists of a suite of three covert channels for transmi ing authentication messages, including two timing-based covert channels that modify the inter-transmission times of CAN messages to a ect the inter-arrival times (IATs) and o sets observed by the MN, and one storage-based covert channel that hides the information in the LSBs of the data payload of normal CAN messages.
• We implement the covert channels of TACAN in a real vehicle testbed (the UW EcoCAR [10] ). We also conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the feasibility of such covert channels using two real CAN tra c datasets, the publicly available Toyota dataset [8] and the EcoCAR dataset. Our results show that the bit error ratios are within 0.1% and 0.42% for the IAT-based and o set-based covert channels, respectively. e bit error ratio of the LSB-based covert channel is equal to 3.1 × 10 −7 %, which is the bit error ratio of a typical CAN bus.
Organization. e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 presents our system and adversary models. Section 4 presents TACAN. A security discussion of TACAN is provided in Section 5. Section 6 presents experimental evaluation. Section 7 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORK
Recent experimental studies have demonstrated that an a acker is able to in ltrate in-vehicle ECUs physically or remotely and mount cyber a acks that would cause potentially life-threatening consequences by disabling breaks or overriding steering [3, 22] . One way to secure the CAN bus is to deploy anomaly-based IDSs based on tra c analysis (e.g., timing/frequency [15] ), entropy [25] , or physical invariants such as clock skew [5, 28] and signal characteristics [6, 7, 17, 24] . While voltage-based IDSs are e ective against ongoing masquerade a ackers, they cannot detect a compromised ECU before a acks are launched (e.g., a stealthy a acker may not launch the a ack until the car is in drive mode). Moreover, it has been recently shown in [27] that the extra wires required by voltage-based IDSs may introduce new a ack surfaces.
Researchers have also a empted to add cryptographic primitives such as Message Authentication Code (MAC) to the CAN bus, including CANAuth [33] , LCAP [14] , CaCAN [20] , and LeiA [26] . Due to the tight bit budget and low throughput of CAN, authentication information is usually embedded into existing CAN messages (i.e., the ID or data eld) and transmi ed through additional CAN messages, thus introducing tra c overheads or increasing the bus load [14, 20, 26] . In this work, we focus on transmi er authentication rather than per-message authentication to avoid such tra c overheads. e key novelty of this work is the use of covert channels, a well-known malicious technique that is converted into defensive applications for authentication purposes. Compared to previous authentication schemes, our scheme does not require protocol modi cations or introduce extra bits or CAN messages.
In literature, there are two main categories of covert channels: timing-based and storage-based. In timing-based covert channels, only the timing of events or tra c is modi ed to share information between two parties and the contents of data stream remain intact.
e storage-based covert channels hide data in a shared resource that is not designed for transferring data, e.g., by exploiting reserved or used elds in the data packet or concealing data in the payload. Compared to steganography techniques that require some form of content as cover, the covert channels exploit network protocols as carrier [36] . In [32] , Taylor et al. propose an approach where the exploitation of covert channel enhances the Modbus/TCP protocol security for industrial control system applications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper that explores covert channels for automotive CAN buses. 
SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODELS
In this section, we present the system (Section 3.1) and adversary (Section 3.2) models for the CAN bus. A list of frequently used notations is provided in Table 1 .
3.1 System Model CAN Bus. As a broadcast medium, the CAN bus connects all ECUs to the same, shared bus line and allows them to transmit any messages to any ECU and observe all ongoing transmissions. Each CAN frame (or message) has a set of prede ned elds, including notably the Arbitration eld (which includes the message ID) and the Data eld (up to 8 bytes). More details about the CAN frame structure are provided in Appendix A.1. If two (or more) ECUs a empt to transmit messages simultaneously, an arbitration scheme based on priority (a smaller message ID indicates a higher priority) is used to determine which ECU transmits rst. e CAN messages do not have transmit timestamps and do not support encryption or authentication.
Clock Skew. In automotive CAN, most messages are transmi ed periodically as per the local clocks of transmi ing ECUs 1 . Since there exists no clock synchronization among ECUs, the frequencies of local clocks are di erent due to clock skew, a physical property caused by variations in the clock's hardware crystal.
Let C A (t) be the time reported by clock A and C t r ue (t) = t be the true time. According to the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [23] , the clock o set of clock A is de ned as O A (t) = C A (t) − C t rue (t), and the clock skew is the rst derivative of clock o set, i.e., S A (t) = O A (t) = C A (t) − 1, which is usually measured in microseconds per second (µs/s) or parts per million (ppm). In the absence of a true clock, the relative clock o set and relative clock skew can be de ned with respect to a reference clock.
Timing Model. As illustrated in Figure 2 , we let t i be the transmit time of message i (assuming t 0 = 0) and ∆t i = t i − t i−1 be the intertransmission time according to the transmi er's clock. If messages are transmi ed every T seconds, we have ∆t i = T and t i = iT . e 1 In the UW EcoCAR (Chevrolet Camaro), all of the 89 messages with distinct IDs are periodic with periods ranging from 10 ms to 5 sec. In the Toyota Camry 2010, 39 of the 42 distinct messages are periodic. In the Dodge Ram Pickup 2010 in [5] , all of the 55 distinct messages are periodic. While CAN message periodicity depends on the manufacturer and the model, the above examples suggest that periodic CAN messages are very common and even dominant on the CAN bus of commercial automobiles. receiver's clock is considered as the reference clock. In practice, there exists a clock skew in the transmi er's clock relative to the reference clock, which introduces an o set O i between the two clocks. erefore, the actual transmit time is t i = t i − O i according to the reference clock. While the clock skew may be slowly varying due to factors including the temperature, the clock skew is almost constant over a short duration. Given a constant clock skew S, the relationship between the elapsed time t i at the transmi er and the elapsed time t i at the receiver is given by S = (t i − t i )/t i . Hence, we have t i = t i /(1 + S), and O i = t i − t i = S 1+S t i . To account for o set deviations due to ji ers, we model the actual clock o set A er a network delay of d i (due to message transmission, propagation, arbitration, and reception) and the zero-mean quantization noise n i [37] , the arrival timestamp of message i is
where 
Adversary Model
We consider an adversary who aims to in ltrate the CAN bus and launch stealthy a acks without being detected. We assume that the adversary can passively monitor and observe all ongoing CAN transmissions. In addition, it has full knowledge of the deployed covert channels and can also observe all authentication messages that are being transmi ed. In reality, there are usually two ways of gaining unauthorized access to the CAN bus: 1) compromise an invehicle ECU either physically or remotely [3] , or 2) plug an external device (a malicious ECU) into the CAN bus [18] . We assume that the adversary has no access to the keys stored in the TPM of the compromised ECU and other legitimate ECUs. e adversary can use the compromised or malicious ECU to perform three basic a acks: 1) suspension, 2) injection, and 3) masquerade a acks, as considered in [5, 21, 28] . As illustrated in Figure 3 (a), a suspension a acker prevents the compromised ECU from transmi ing certain messages, while an injection a acker can fabricate and inject CAN messages of arbitrary choices of message ID, content, and timing, as sketched in Figure 3 (b). Injection a acks can lead to more sophisticated a acks such as the DoS a ack [15] and the bus-o a ack [4] . In the (stealthy) masquerade a ack, the adversary will need to compromise two ECUs -one is weakly compromised (acting as the strong a acker who can only launch suspension a acks) and the other one is fully compromised (acting as the strong a acker who can both launch suspension and injection a acks). In the example in Figure 3 (c), the adversary suspends the weakly compromised ECU 2 from transmi ing message 0xB2 and uses the fully compromised ECU 1 to inject messages 0xB2 claiming to originate from ECU 2 . As compared to the suspension and injection a ack, it is much more di cult to detect the stealthy masquerade a ack.
TACAN
In this section, we provide details on the TACAN architecture (Section 4.1) and introduce our transmi er authentication protocol (Section 4.2). We then present three covert channels for transmi ing authentication messages: 1) IAT-based (Section 4.3), 2) o set-based (Section 4.4), and 3) LSB-based (Section 4.5).
TACAN architecture
As shown in Figure 4 , TACAN consists of in-vehicle ECUs and a trusted MN connected to the same CAN bus. We assume that the MN is pre-installed by the manufacturer during production and requires direct physical access by authorized parties (e.g., an authorized repairs shop) to prevent potential tampering and compromises. We further assume that the deployed covert channels are pre-con gured during production or re-con gured during maintenance, so that the one-way communication of authentication information from ECUs to the MN can be successful established. Similar to [14, 26, 33] , a master key (MK) is assumed to be preshared between each ECU and the MN, which is stored in the TPM. Updating of MKs (e.g., when adding or replacing an ECU) should again require direct physical access by authorized parties to the involved ECUs. e procedure of key updating is outside the scope of this paper. During operation, Each ECU will generate a session key (SK) from the MK and a global counter and further use it to generate authentication messages. We describe the transmi er authentication protocol in more detail in the following section. 
Transmitter Authentication Protocol
Inspired by the work in [26] , the MN performs unidirectional authentication of each transmi ing ECU. e parameters used by TACAN for the n ECUs are summarized as follows:
• e master key MK i with i ∈ {1, ..., n} is a pre-shared key between ECU i and the MN, which is securely stored in the TPMs of both parties.
• e session key SK i with i ∈ {1, ..., n} is used to generate authentication messages for ECU i .
• e local counter l i with i ∈ {1, ..., n} is an incremental value that stores the number of transmi ed authentication messages for ECU i .
is value is contained in the authentication message.
• e global counter i with i ∈ {1, ..., n} represents a value updated on speci c circumstances (e.g., car ignition, l i over ow) and it is used to generate SK i . We assume that both SK i and i are stored in the TPM so that an a acker cannot tamper with them and launch replay a acks.
Session Key Generation. Each ECU i stores its own master key MK i , and the MN stores the master keys of all ECUs. e session key for the n ECUs is generated from MK i and i as follows:
where HMAC(·) refers to the Hash-based Message Authentication Code algorithm [19] . It is possible to use di erent hashing algorithms for HMAC (e.g., HMAC-SHA256) to meet the desired security requirements.
Every time SK i is updated, l i will be reset to zero. On the receiver side, the MN uses the same MK i and i to compute the corresponding SK i for ECU i . Counter synchronization is performed when i is incremented. Since authentication message veri cation failures can be caused by de-synchronization of counters, a re-synchronization procedure may be performed. More details are provided in [26] . Authentication Message Generation. ECU i rst increments l i and then computes the authentication message A m as follows:
where "||" denotes bit string concatenation. For the scope of our work, we assume that all the parameters (keys and counters) conceived for TACAN are binary values. As we can see, A m is not related to any normal CAN message and merely serves as an identi er for ECU i .
As for l i , a 24-bit counter can last for 46+ hours for a 10-ms message even in per-message authentication, which is su cient for our transmi er authentication protocol that transmits A m at a much smaller frequency. Implementations of TACAN are free to use whichever hashing algorithm for HMAC and sizes of keys that are deemed strong enough. Instead of transmi ing the entire digest that are usually hundreds of bits long, the transmi er may truncate each digest to several bits to reduce the transmission time (e.g., using the least signi cant 8 bits or XORing all bytes together to create a condensed 8-bit version of the digest, as in [20, 31] ).
IAT-Based Covert Channel
Figure 5 illustrates two timing-based covert channels for periodic CAN messages, in which the transmi ing ECU embeds the authentication message into the ITTs of CAN messages, which can be extracted from the IATs or o sets by the MN. By verifying the received authentication message, the MN can authenticate the transmi er. In this section, we present the IAT-based covert channel.
Observations. According to our timing model in Eq. (1), the observed IAT between messages (i − 1) and i is given by
Since almost all CAN messages are periodic (i.e., ∆t i = T ), the IATs have a mean of E[∆a i ] = T /(1+S) and a variance of Var(∆a i ) = 2σ 2 η . In practice, clock skews are usually very small (in the order of 100s of ppm). Hence, we have κ = E[∆a i ] ≈ T , where κ is considered as the reference level for IATs 2 .
From Eq. (2), we can see that an amount of deviation δ in ITTs will lead to a corresponding change of δ /(1 + S) in IATs, which may be easily observed by the receiver when variances in IATs are small. In the case of large variances in IATs, the receiver may compute the running average to smooth out the noise, that is,
where L is the window length. rough the running average, the variance of IATs can be reduced signi cantly by a factor of L 2 .
Note that due to the existence of 1/L in the bracket, the amount of deviation δ needs to be added to L consecutive ITTs in order to maintain the same level of changes in observed IATs.
As an example, we plot the IAT distributions of message 0x020 (T = 0.01 sec) from the Toyota dataset [8] in Figure 6 . When δ = 0.02T = 2 · 10 −4 sec is added to or subtracted from IATs (to simulate operations at the transmi er assuming negligible clock skew e ects), the three clusters (representing a bit 0 or a bit 1 or neither) cannot be separated from each other (Figure 6(a) ), which may lead to bit errors at the receiver side. In contrast, with the running average of L = 4, the clusters are clearly distinguishable 2 In the case of very large clock skews, the reference level κ needs to be calibrated o ine from the training dataset. ( Figure 6(b) ) and can be separated through thresholding. e above observations motivate our design of IAT-based covert channels.
Embedding A m into ITTs. Given A m of n m bits, the transmi er rst constructs an authentication frame A f by inserting n s /2 silence bits before and a er A m . e main purpose of silence bits (se ing δ = 0) is to maintain the reference level of IATs and signal the start and end of A m . Hence, the total length of A f is n f = n m + n s . For instance, if A m = 0101 and n s = 2, we have A f = 0101 . Each bit i is modulated into L consecutive ITTs as follows,
Extracting A m from IATs. On the receiver side, the MN records the arrival timestamps for the targeted messages and computes the IATs. It then performs running average with the right choice of L to obtain {∆ā[i]}. Since each bit is repeated for L consecutive ITTs, the receiver needs to sample {∆ā[i]} every L values. Let the sampling o set be τ and the j-th sample be ∆ā[jL + τ ]. If τ is correctly chosen, the total distance between each modulated sample and the reference level (κ) should be maximized, i.e.,
en the receiver can convert the sampled values to bits through thresholding as follows,
where Γ l = κ − δ /2 and Γ u = κ + δ /2 are the lower and upper thresholds, respectively, κ ≈ T , and " " is the silence bit. A er that, the output bits are concatenated and then split at the silence bits to obtain A m . Note that in order to establish a reliable IAT-based covert channel, the parameters including L and δ need to be pre-shared between the transmi ing ECU and the MN, as assumed in Section 3.1. We leave online estimation of the covert channel parameters from the MN side as future work.
O set-Based Covert Channel
e idea of the o set-based covert channel is very similar to the IAT-based covert channel ( Figure 5 ). e main di erence is that the former performs running average on IATs (including the added deviations) to smooth out the noise, while the later aims to accumulate the deviations to di erentiate the modulated samples from noise. Our observations about clock o sets are as follows.
Observations. According to our timing model in Section 3.1 and Eq. (1), we have t i = i j=1 ∆t j , a 0 = η 0 , and a i = t i /(1 + S) + η i . Since the receiver only knows the nominal period (T ) of the targeted message, it computes the observed clock o set as the di erence between the expected elapsed time (up to message i) at the transmi er and the actual elapsed time at the receiver, i.e.,
As we can see, if the transmi er adds δ to L consecutive ITTs (∆t j = T + δ for j = 1, ..., L), the deviations will accumulate and lead to a decrease of δL/(1 + S) inÔ i . Hence, by monitoring the changes inÔ i , the receiver can determine the transmi ed bits and extract A m from clock o sets. e above observations motivate our design of o set-based covert channels.
Embedding A m into ITTs. Di erent from the IAT-based covert channel (Section 4.3), the transmi er embeds each bit of A f into L consecutive ITTs as follows,
for j ∈ [iL, (i + 1)L), and
, where L is assumed to be an even integer. In other words, in order to transmit a bit 0/1, the transmi er adds −δ /δ to the rst L/2 ITTs and then subtracts −δ /δ from the following L/2 ITTs so that the observed clock o set returns to the reference level a er the transmission of each bit.
Extracting A m from O sets. On the receiver side, the monitor node records the arrival timestamps and processes the IATs in batches. Since each A f has n f bits and each bit is modulated into L consecutive ITTs, a total number of N = n f L consecutive IATs belong to the same A f , where N is referred to as the batch size. Denote the i-th IAT in the k-batch as ∆a k,i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ N . en the observed clock o set with respect to the beginning of the current batch up to the i-th IAT iŝ
)/2 be the midpoint (assuming that at least a bit 0 and a bit 1 are transmi ed), which is considered as the reference level of clock o sets. Since clock skew is usually very small (100s of ppm) and we are computing batch-wise clock o sets, the impact of clock skew is small, and thus we assume that the κ is constant for the duration of a batch 3 . Since each bit a ects L IATs, the receiver needs to sample {Ô k [i]} every L values with a sampling o set of τ and obtain the j-th sample asÔ k [jL + τ ]. If τ is correctly chosen, then the total distance between each sample and the reference level should be maximized, i.e.,
en the receiver converts the sampled values to bits through the following threhsolding-based scheme,
, else, where Γ l = κ − 1 4 δL and Γ u = κ + 1 4 δL are the lower and upper thresholds, respectively, and " " is the silence bit.
e term of 1 4 δL is due to the fact that δ is added to (or subtracted from) L/2 consecutive ITTs, and thus the maximum total deviation is ± 1 2 δL. e midpoints between κ and κ ± 1 2 δL are chosen as thresholds. Eventually, A m is extracted by concatenating all decoded bits and spli ing them at the silence bits.
Impact on CAN bus schedulability. As we have shown, in both the IAT-based and o set-based covert channels, a certain amount of deviation is added to the ITTs. As a result, it may increase the worst-case response time of CAN messages, which is de ned as the longest time from the initiating event (that puts the message in the transmission queue) occurring to the message being received by the nodes that require it. If we apply the schedulability analysis in [9] to TACAN, we can show that the e ect of TACAN is equivalent to increasing the blocking delay by a constant amount of time (hundreds of µs) and increasing the message transmission time by a small percentage. erefore, to achieve e ective use of covert channels, TACAN parameters need to be experimentally obtained and ne tuned prior to deployment to ensure the schedulability of the CAN bus. A more detailed discussion is provided in Appendix A.2.
LSB-Based Covert Channel
In this section, we introduce a storage-based covert channel that embeds the authentication messages inside the LSBs of the data payload of normal CAN messages transmi ed by an ECU, referred to as the LSB-based covert channel (Figure 7 ). Unlike the timingbased covert channels, the LSB-based covert channel can be applied to aperiodic CAN messages. For the scope of this work, we use the CAN data frames to develop our methodology.
Observations. In order to transmit an authentication message over the CAN bus, it is very common to make use of the existing elds of a CAN message, such as the data eld [13, 14, 20] (at least one byte) and the extended ID eld [14] , or simply introduce additional CAN messages [13, 14] . In practice, however, if all bytes in the data eld have been used or the CAN bus is already heavily loaded, then the existing approaches of exploiting CAN messages may disrupt the ECU's functionality or increase arbitration delays. Di erent from existing schemes that a empt to authenticate messages, our transmi er authentication scheme aims to authenticate the transmi er instead of each message. Hence, authentication messages are transmi ed much less frequently, which means that authentication bits may be spread over multiple CAN messages, using only a few bits from each CAN message. Moreover, having realized that certain CAN messages are used to carry sensor values and most of them are oating numbers, we may use the L LSBs (e.g., L = 1 or 2) for authentication purposes without causing signi cant degradation in accuracy. Taking the Toyota Camry as an example, there are at least 7 messages out of 42 that carry sensor values (e.g., wheel speeds, engine speed, vehicle speed, odometer, brake pressure, steering angle) [8] . We would expect more CAN messages that carry sensor values in newer automobiles. e above observations motivate our design of LSB-based covert channels.
Embedding A m to LSBs. e embedding process is implemented as a sub-layer between the Application and the Data Link layers. For each message A m (plus a known preamble to indicate the start and end of A m ), it substitutes the least signi cant L bits of the CAN message with the next L bits in A m . No modi cation is needed if the L bits happen to be the same.
Extracting A m from LSBs. On the receiver side, the MN extracts the L LSBs from the received CAN messages and reconstructs the authentication message. If the MN fails to verify the authentication message, it will raise an alert that indicates possible compromise of the transmi ing ECU or malicious exploitation of the CAN bus.
As in the case of timing-based covert channels, we assume that the se ings for the LSB-based covert channel are pre-shared between each ECU and the MN during production and updated during maintenance if necessary. More details about the embedding and extraction processes are provided in Appendix A.3.
SECURITY DISCUSSION
Compared to the existing message authentication schemes [14, 20, 26, 33] that a empt to verify the authenticity of each message, TACAN extracts and veri es authentication message embedded in the timing or LSBs of normal messages to authenticate the transmitting ECU and also serves the purpose of intrusion detection. Hence, TACAN can detect a acks that interrupt the transmission of normal CAN messages (e.g., suspension, injection, and DoS a acks), as well as a acks in which a ackers fail to generate valid authentication messages (e.g., forgery, replay, and masquerade a acks). e above security properties provided by TACAN are independent of the CAN protocol and the contents of CAN messages. Security Features. We summarize a list of features provided by TACAN as follows: 1) TACAN securely stores both master and session keys in the ECU's TPM to prevent being compromised by the adversary, 2) TACAN employs monotonic counters for generating session keys and authentication messages for each ECU, and 3) TACAN requires each ECU to continuously transmit unique authentication messages to enable real-time transmi er authentication.
Note that due to the third feature, if the a acker compromises an in-vehicle ECU but does not a empt to deceive TACAN (i.e., stop generating authentication messages), it will interrupt the continuous transmission of authentication messages and thus will be detected immediately. In addition, since basic a acks like suspension, injection, and DoS a acks can be easily detected, we focus on more sophisticated a acks in the rest of this section that actively a empt to evade TACAN, including the forgery a ack, the replay a ack, and the masquerade a ack.
Detecting Forgery Attacks. In the forgery a ack, the adversary has already compromised an in-vehicle ECU that is protected by TACAN and a empts to generate valid authentication messages that can be veri ed by the MN in order to evade the detection of TACAN. Since our adversary model (Section 3.2) assumes that the a acker has no access to the TPM of the compromised ECU, the a acker has to forge a valid digest for each local counter value without the session key. With a condensed digest of M bits, the probability of a successful forgery is 1/2 M . For example, when M = 8, this probability is 1/2 8 ≈ 0.4%. Repeated forgeries will be prevented due to the use of monotonic counters.
Detecting Replay Attacks. A replay a acker has in ltrated the CAN bus and a empts to replay previously transmi ed authentication messages of the targeted ECU with the hope of passing the veri cation process at the MN. It is easy to see that such a empts will be detected by TACAN due to the use of monotonic counters.
Detecting Masquerade Attacks. As mentioned in Section 3.2, a masquerade a ack (including the more sophisticated cloaking a ack [28] ) requires in-vehicle ECUs to be weakly and/or fully compromised. As a result, TACAN will force the a acker to perform a forgery or replay a ack, not only for the compromised ECU itself, but also for the ECU the a acker a empts to masquerade as.
erefore, a masquerade a ack will be detected by TACAN.
EVALUATION
In this section, we implement the proposed covert channels on the testbed and report their performance in terms of the throughput and bit error ratio using the datasets collected from two real vehicles, a 2010 Toyota Camry [8] and a 2016 Chevrolet Camaro (University of Washington EcoCAR) [10] . Testbed validation is in Section 6.1, then the evaluations of covert channels IAT-based, o set-based, and LSBbased are in Section 6.2, Section 6.3, and Section 6.4, respectively.
Testbed Validation
As shown in Figure 8 , our EcoCAR testbed consists of the UW Eco-CAR and two testbed ECUs, which are connected via the On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) port. e UW EcoCAR hosts 8 stock ECus TX RX OBD-II Port Figure 8 : EcoCAR testbed. Two Raspberry Pi-based ECUs are connected to the OBD-II port at the back of the EcoCAR, one as the transmitter and the other one as the receiver.
and two experimental ECUs. ere are a total of 2500+ messages using 89 di erent messages IDs are exchanged on the CAN bus every second. Each ECU consists of a Raspberry Pi 3 and a PiCAN 2 board (using a MCP2515 CAN controller and a MCP2551 CAN transceiver). e SocketCAN [29] library is used to enable the interaction between the added ECUs and the UW EcoCAR.
In order to demonstrate the proposed covert channels, we implemented them in Python in the transmi er and collected the CAN data traces using the receiver. Since the LSB-based covert channel is expected to have a very small bit error ratio, we focus on the timing-based (IAT-based and o set-based) covert channels. As an example, we set n m = 36 bits (length of authentication message) with alternating bit values and n s = 4 bits (number of silence bits). Hence, each authentication frame is n f = 40 bits long. In order to avoid any con ict with existing messages, we chose a non-existent message ID of 0x180 and set the message period T = 10 ms and δ = 0.2 ms (2% of T ). While a non-existent message ID was used in our experiments, we assumed the Raspberry Pi-based ECU as a stock ECU that transmits messages with ID=0x180 and that is capable of modifying the timing of message ITTs. We would like to emphasize that TACAN does not require a new message ID or additional CAN messages to implement the proposed covert channels. Figure 9 provides an example of observed IATs in the IAT-based covert channel. As we can see, without running average, the modulated IATs are noisy, and thresholding at the receiver side may lead to many possible bit errors (Figure 9(a) ). In contrast, the running average process can e ectively reduce IAT variations, making the peaks and valleys of the modulated IATs clearly stand out, which indicates a smaller probability of bit errors (Figure 9(b) ).
An example of observed o sets in the o set-based covert channel is provided in Figure 10 . As we can see, unlike the IAT-based covert channel, increasing L in the o set-based covert channel e ectively increases the accumulated amount of deviations in o sets at the receiver side and thus reduces the bit error probability. In the rest of this section, we evaluate each covert channel in more detail.
Evaluation of IAT-Based Covert Channel
In this section, we evaluate the performance of IAT-based covert channels in terms of throughput and bit error ratio.
roughput. Given n m bits for A m , n s silence bits, and a window length of L, the time it takes for a CAN message with period T to transmit an authentication frame A f is T f = (n m + n s )LT , which increases linearly as function of L and T . en the throughput or rate for transmi ing A m is r m = n m /T f bits per second (bps). For 
Bit Error Ratio.
e bit error ratio is de ned as the number of bit errors divided by the total number of bits transmi ed in a given time interval. In order to evaluate the bit error ratio of IAT-based covert channels on real vehicles, we collected data for six representative messages (including message 0x180 that was transmi ed from the testbed ECU) with di erent ID levels, periods, and noise levels from the Toyota Camry [8] and the UW EcoCAR [10] , as shown in Table 2 . e same EcoCAR dataset was used in [35] . Note that IAT noise is quanti ed in terms of the standard deviation (normalized by the period) and the range (the di erence between the maximum IAT and the minimum IAT, normalized by the period). In this experiment, we rst preprocess the data trace of each message to ll in any missing messages. We set n m = 36 bits and n s = 4 bits, and thus each frame is 40 bits long. Note that the choices of n m and n s are not critical here, since we focus on the bit error ratio instead of the frame error ratio. Out of 100 frames (100n m bits in total), the number of bit errors (b j b j ) is recorded and divided by the number of transmi ed bits to obtain the bit error ratio. e amount of deviation δ is xed to 2% of the message period (T ). Since clock skews are small, we directly add δ to IATs to simulate the e ect of adding the same amount to ITTs at the transmi er side. As illustrated in Figure 11 , the performance of IAT-based covert channel varies a lot among di erent messages, depending on their noise levels. In general, the bit error ratios are very high with L = 1, but they quickly drop to 0 as L increases for all messages, which demonstrates the e ectiveness of running average. Moreover, we observe that messages with a large IAT range (e.g., 0x180, 0x0D1 and 0x185) tend to require a large L value to establish a reliable IAT-based covert channel. With L = 6, all messages have a bit error ratio of less than 0.1%.
Evaluation of O set-Based Covert Channel
Since the throughput analysis of o set-based covert channels is the same with that of IAT-based covert channels, we focus on the bit error performance in this experiment using the same setup in Section 6.2. Results are provided in Figure 12 .
As we can see, the performance of o set-based covert channels again depends on the characteristics of individual messages. When L = 4, the bit error ratio is less than 1% for messages 0x224, 0x185, and 0x22A. As L increases, added deviations accumulate at the receiver side, thus e ectively reducing the bit error ratio. With L = 8, the bit error ratio has dropped to less than 0.42% for all messages. As compared to the IAT-based covert channel, the o setbased covert channel is less e cient and requires a larger L value.
is is mainly because it adds deviations to only the rst half of L consecutive ITTs, and the second half is used only for the purpose of maintaining the reference level for clock o sets, which contributes very li le in di erentiating the modulated samples from the noise.
Evaluation of LSB-Based Covert Channel
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the LSB-based covert channel in terms of throughput, bit error ratio, and accuracy loss.
roughput. Given n m bits for A m and n s bits for the start sequence, it takes T f = n f T /L = (n m + n s )T /L sec to transmit an authentication frame A f using L LSBs of a CAN message with period T . en the throughputs for transmi ing A f and A m are r f = n f /T f and r m = n m /T f , respectively. For example, suppose Bit Error Ratio. Since the LSB-based covert channel embeds the authentication message into the data payload of normal CAN messages, its bit error ratio will be as small as that of the CAN bus itself. According to [11] , the bit error ratios of CAN in normal environments (factory production line) and aggressive environments (two meters away from a high-frequency arc-welding machine) are 3.1 × 10 −7 % and 2.6 × 10 −5 %, respectively.
Accuracy Loss. As the LSB-based covert channel modi es the LSBs in the data elds of CAN data frames, such modi cation will lead to accuracy loss of sensor values. With changes of one LSB (L = 1), the accuracy loss of the same scale with the resolution (or the discretization error) of that sensor value. Increasing L will result in larger throughput and accuracy loss. Hence, manufacturers will need to assess the impact of accuracy loss in CAN data on the functionality and safety, as well as trade o the accuracy loss against throughput when deploying the LSB-based covert channel. It is important to highlight that for periodic messages that cannot tolerate accuracy loss, manufacturers may deploy IAT-based and o set-based covert channels instead. In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed LSBbased covert channel, we consider two CAN messages: 1) the wheel velocity value based on the publicly available Toyota dataset [8] and 2) the engine coolant temperature value that we identi ed through reverse engineering from the EcoCAR dataset [10] . In our experiments, we set L to 1 or 2 and quantify the accuracy loss in terms of the maximum error (using the original values as ground truth). Note that we intentionally keep L ≤ 2 in order to avoid signi cant distortions to the underlying sensor values or jeopardize the functionality of the receiving ECU.
As illustrated in Figure 13 and highlighted in the magni ed box, the maximum error introduced to wheel velocity is 0.01 km/h for L = 1 and 0.03 km/h for L = 2, which is very insigni cant. As for the engine coolant temperature as shown in Figure 14 , the maximum error is 1 • C for L = 1 and 3 • C for L = 2, which are still moderate.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced TACAN, a transmi er authentication scheme using covert channels for the CAN bus, that allows a MN to verify the authenticity of the transmi ing ECU. We developed IAT-based, o set-based, and LSB-based covert channels to communicate the authentication information between ECUs and the MN without introducing protocol modi cations or tra c overheads.
We provided a security discussion for TACAN and demonstrated the proposed covert channels through testbed validation and experimental evaluation. Our future work will include experimental evaluation of TACAN under various a acks against the CAN bus. In addition, we will also improve the throughput of the proposed covert channels and explore hybrid covert channel schemes.
A APPENDIX A.1 CAN Frame
As illustrated in Figure 15 , each CAN frame or message has a set of prede ned elds, including the Start of Frame (SOF) eld, the Arbitration eld (including a 11-bit message ID for the base frame format or a 29-bit message ID for the extended frame format), the Control eld, the Data eld (8-64 bits), the CRC eld, the ACK eld, and the End of Frame (EOF) eld. 
A.2 Impact on CAN Bus Schedulability
In order to understand the impact of TACAN on CAN bus schedulability, we apply the schedulability analysis in [9] . For the ease of discussion, we provide a summary of de nitions as below. e same notations in [9] are used for consistency.
• m: Message priority (used interchangeably with message ID).
• C m : Transmission time, de ned as the longest time that the message can take to be transmi ed.
euing ji er, de ned as the longest time between the initiating event and the message being queued, ready to be transmi ed on the bus.
• w m : euing delay, de ned as the longest time that the message can remain in the CAN controller slot or device driver queue, before commencing successful transmission on the bus.
• T m : Message period, de ned as the minimum inter-arrival time of the event that triggers queueing of the message. Such events may occur strictly periodically with a period of T m or sporadically with a minimum separation of T m .
• R m : Worst-case response time of message m, de ned as the longest time from the initiating event occurring to the message being received by the nodes that require it.
• D m : Hard deadline, de ned as the maximum permi ed time from occurrence of the initiating event to the end of successful transmission of the message. A message is schedulable if and only if its worst-case response time is no greater than its deadline (R m ≤ D m ). A CAN bus is schedulable if and only if all messages on the CAN bus are schedulable.
As per [9] , we have C m = (80 + 10s m )τ bit (including bit stu ng), where s m is the number of data bytes and τ bit is the transmission time of a single bit. For a 8-byte message on a 500 kbps CAN bus, we have τ bit = 2 µs and C m = 320 µs. While CAN nodes typically have separate clock sources, all the timing quantities (e.g., message ji ers, bit times, message periods, and deadlines) that derived from node clocks will be converted to real-time.
e message m's worst-case response time R m is given by
and the queuing delay w m consists of two elements:
• Blocking B m , due to lower priority messages being transmi ed when message m is queued, and • Interference due to higher priority messages which may win arbitration and be transmi ed in preference to message m. e blocking delay B m is given by B m = max k ∈lp(m) (C k ), where lp(m) is the set of messages with lower priority than m.
In order to analyze the worst-case response times, it is important to characterize the busy period, in which all messages of priority m or higher, queued strictly before the end of busy period, are transmi ed during the busy period.
e maximal busy period begins with a so-called critical instant where message m is queued simultaneously with all higher priority messages and then each of these higher priority messages is subsequently queued again a er the shortest possible time interval.
For simplicity, we assume that only one instance of message m is transmi ed during a priority level-m busy period. In this case, the worst-case queuing delay is given by:
Since the right hand side is a monotonic non-decreasing function of w m , Eq. (5) can be solved using the following recurrence relation, 
A suitable starting value is w 0 m = B m , and the recurrence relation iterates until, either m + w n+1 m + C m > D m , i.e., the message is not schedulable, or w n+1 m = w n m , in which case the worst-case response of message m is given by m + w n+1 m + C m . In order to apply the above schedulability analysis to TACAN, we de ne T m = T m − δ . Since TACAN adds at most δ to each ITT, which can be considered as part of the queuing delay, we have 
where
0.02 0.98
and
erefore, the e ect of TACAN on schedulability is equivalent to increasing the blocking delay by a constant amount of time and increasing the message transmission time by a certain percentage. For example, if we assume 45 messages with higher priority (half messages in the EcoCAR), the increase in the blocking delay and message transmission time is 294 µs and 6.5 µs (C m = 320 µs), respectively. By solving Eq. (7), we can compute the corresponding worst-case response time of message m with TACAN. Hence, to achieve e ective use of covert channels, TACAN parameters need
